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Abstract 
This paper presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic choice under risk. In this model, 
when it comes to choosing one lottery over another, each alternative has a chance of being 
selected, unless one lottery stochastically dominates the other. An individual behaves as if 
he compares lotteries to a reference lottery—a least upper bound or a greatest lower bound 
in terms of weak dominance. The proposed model is compatible with several well-known 
violations of expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect and the violations of 
the betweenness. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the proposed model are 
completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity, common consequence independence, 
outcome monotonicity, and odds ratio independence.  
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Probabilistic Choice and Stochastic Dominance 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to present a simple model of decision making under risk 
that captures two stylized facts: 1) in general, people choose probabilistically between risky 
lotteries; 2) people seldom violate strict dominance or transparent first-order stochastic 
dominance. Numerous experimental studies of repeated decision making under risk 
demonstrate that individual choices are probabilistic in nature (e.g. Camerer, 1989; Starmer 
and Sugden, 1989; Hey and Orme, 1994; Wu, 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Loomes 
and Sugden, 1998; Hey, 2001; Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Schmidt and Neugebauer, 2007).  
For example, consider a choice between getting £10 for certain and a 50%-50% 
chance of receiving either £30 or nothing. When facing this decision problem repeatedly, 
some people opt for the sure amount on one occasion and for the risky lottery on the other. 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) observe that 11 out of 46 subjects (23.9%) reverse their initial 
choice on the second repetition of this decision problem. Traditional decision theories (e.g. 
expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory) interpret such contradictory choice 
pattern as a sign of indifference between the sure amount and the risky lottery. 
Consider now a choice between £10 for certain and a risky lottery that yields a 60% 
chance of £30 (zero otherwise). If an individual is genuinely indifferent between £10 for 
sure and a 50% chance of £30, he strictly prefers a 60% chance of £30 over £10 for sure. 
However, Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that 9 out of 46 subjects (19.6%) choose £10 for 
sure over a 50% chance of £30 and vice versa and they also choose £10 for sure over a 60% 
chance of £30 on at least one occasion. Traditional decision theories cannot explain this 
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empirical finding because an individual cannot be simultaneously indifferent between £10 
for sure, a 50% chance of £30 and a 60% chance of £30. 
Even though people choose probabilistically between £10 for sure and a 50% 
chance of £30 as well as between £10 for sure and a 60% chance of £30, they do not choose 
probabilistically between a 50% chance of £30 and a 60% chance of £30. People seldom 
violate strict dominance or transparent first-order stochastic dominance (e.g. Carbone and 
Hey, 1995; Loomes and Sugden, 1998; Hey, 2001). For example, Loomes and Sugden 
(1998) find that only one out of 46 subjects (2.2%) has chosen a 15% chance of £30 over a 
20% chance of £30 (zero otherwise) on one of two repetitions of the decision problem. 
Popular models of probabilistic choice such as the Fechner model of random errors 
(Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994; Hey, 1995; Buschena and Zilberman, 2000), the 
Luce choice model (Luce and Suppes, 1965; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 
1996), and the constant error/tremble model (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Carbone, 1997; 
Loomes et al., 2002) generally predict too many violations of strict dominance and 
transparent stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2007) develops a model of probabilistic 
choice (stochastic expected utility theory) that rules out violations of strict dominance but 
allows for violations of stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2006b) extends this model to 
discriminate between low rates of violation when stochastic dominance is transparent and 
high rates of violation when stochastic dominance is not transparent. Fishburn (1978) 
presents an axiomatic model of probabilistic binary choice (incremental expected utility 
advantage model) that does not allow for any violations of stochastic dominance. A popular 
random utility model (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) also 
rules out the violations of stochastic dominance. 
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This paper presents a new axiomatic model of probabilistic choice that can be 
summarized as follows. Let { }nxxX ,...,1=  be a set of outcomes (consequences) numbered 
so that an individual always chooses outcome ix  over outcome jx  when ji > . Let ℒ be a 
set of probability distributions (lotteries) on X. Lottery ( )∈naaA ,...,1 ℒ weakly dominates 
lottery ( )∈nbbB ,...,1 ℒ, denoted as A B, if ∑∑ == ≤ ji iji i ba 11  for any { }nj ,...,1∈ . The 
partially ordered set (ℒ, ) is a lattice i.e. for any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ there exists a least 
upper bound BA∨  and a greatest lower bound BA∧ . According to the proposed model of 
probabilistic choice, an individual chooses lottery A over another lottery B with probability 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU
BAUAUBAP ∧−+∧−
∧−= ϕϕ
ϕ, ,  
where U:ℒ→ is the expected utility function and :+→+ is a non-decreasing function 
with ( ) 00 =ϕ . 
Model (1) has several intuitive properties. An individual always chooses A over B if 
A stochastically dominates B (in this case BAB ∧= ). Similarly, an individual never 
chooses A over B if B stochastically dominates A (in this case BAA ∧= ). An individual 
chooses A over B with probability P(A,B)≥0.5 if U(A)≥U(B). Classical expected utility 
theory is a limiting case of (1) when ( ) λϕ zz =  and +∞→λ . When lotteries have no more 
than three outcomes, model (1) coincides with a random utility model if function (.) is 
homogeneous. 
Binary choice probabilities admit representation (1) if and only if they satisfy the 
following axioms: completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, continuity, common 
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consequence independence, outcome monotonicity and odds ratio independence. The 
proposed model of probabilistic choice is compatible with several well-known violations of 
expected utility theory such as the common ratio effect (e.g. Allais, 1953) and the 
violations of the betweenness property (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994). 
The proposed model of probabilistic choice has a simple interpretation. Stochastic 
dominance imposes a greatest lower bound on every pair of lotteries. This greatest lower 
bound serves as an endogenous reference lottery. An individual compares two lotteries 
relative to this natural referent. The closer is lottery A (B) to the reference lottery BA∧  in 
terms of expected utility, the closer is the choice probability P(A,B) to zero (one). 
Model (1) has the same functional form as the strict utility model discussed in 
Becker et al. (1963) with the only difference that lotteries are compared to a reference 
lottery BA∧ . In other words, we can consider a strict utility model as a variation of choice 
rule (1) when the reference lottery is zero for all lottery pairs. In contrast, the model of 
probabilistic choice proposed in this paper has an endogenous reference lottery BA∧ . This 
reference lottery captures the context of a decision problem. In particular, it allows a 
decision maker to avoid violations of stochastic dominance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents six axioms 
imposed on a primitive binary choice probability function (a fuzzy preference relation) and 
discusses their descriptive validity. Section III contains the main result of the paper—a 
representation theorem for binary choice probabilities and discusses its main implications 
and possible extensions. Section IV generalizes the proposed model from binary choice to 
choice among m>2 alternatives. Section V concludes. 
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II. Axioms 
Let { }nxxX ,...,1=  denote a finite set of outcomes (consequences). These outcomes 
can be monetary payoffs, consumption bundles, portfolios of assets, health states etc. 
Objects of choice are risky lotteries. A risky lottery ( )naaA ,...,1  is a probability distribution 
on X  i.e. it delivers outcome ix  with a probability [ ]1,0∈ia , { }ni ,...,1∈ , and 11 =∑ =ni ia . 
A degenerate lottery that yields one outcome Xxi ∈  with probability one is denoted by iX . 
A compound lottery ( )BA αα −+ 1  yields a risky lottery A with probability [ ]1,0∈α  and a 
risky lottery B with probability α−1 . The set of all risky lotteries is denoted by ℒ. 
The primitive of choice is a binary choice probability function P:ℒ¯ℒ→[0,1], 
which is also known as a fuzzy preference relation (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1984). P(A,B) 
represents the probability that an individual chooses lottery A over lottery B in a direct 
binary choice. For any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ, BA ≠ , probability P(A,B) is observable from a 
relative frequency with which an individual chooses A when he is asked to choose 
repeatedly between A and B. Probability P(A,A), A∈ℒ, cannot be observed from actual 
choices and it is not defined. We now present six axioms imposed on binary choice 
probability function. 
Axiom 1 (Completeness) ( ) ( ) 1,, =+ ABPBAP  for any lotteries A,B∈ℒ, BA ≠ . 
Axiom 1 states that only two events are possible in a binary choice between A and 
B—either an individual chooses A over B or an individual chooses B over A.  
Axiom 2 (Weak Stochastic Transitivity) For any three lotteries A,B,C∈ℒ such that 
CBA ≠≠  the following holds: 
a) if P(A,B)≥0.5 and P(B,C)≥0.5 then P(A,C)≥0.5; 
b) if P(A,B)=1 and P(B,C)=1 then P(A,C)=1. 
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Axiom 2a imposes a basic consistency requirement on binary choice probabilities. If 
an individual is likely to choose A over B and he is also likely to choose B over C, then this 
individual is also likely to choose A over C. Empirical data generally support weak 
stochastic transitivity (e.g. Luce and Suppes, 1965; Tversky and Russo, 1969; Luce, 1977). 
Part b) of Axiom 2 slightly strengthens traditional weak stochastic transitivity. In particular, 
it postulates that if an individual always chooses A over B and he always chooses B over C, 
then this individual always chooses A over C. 
 Axiom 3 (Continuity) The sets [ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 ≥−+∈ CBAP ααα  and 
[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 ≤−+∈ CBAP ααα  are closed for any three lotteries A,B,C∈ℒ, such 
that ( )CBA αα −+≠ 1  for some [ ]1,0∈α . 
Axiom 3 states that if an individual is likely (unlikely) to choose a lottery over each 
element of a converging sequence of lotteries then he is also likely (unlikely) to choose this 
lottery over the limit of the sequence. Continuity rules out the possibility of lexicographic 
choices (e.g. an individual cares first of all for the prospect of getting at least something for 
sure). Continuity is a necessary condition for many popular models of probabilistic choice 
such as the Fechner model of random errors, the Luce choice model and the constant 
error/tremble model (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2008).  
Axioms 1-3 are straightforward translations of the axioms of expected utility theory, 
when a primitive binary choice probability function is used instead of a primitive binary 
preference relation. 
Axiom 4 (Common Consequence Independence) ( ) ( )( ) =−+−+ CBCAP αααα 1,1  
( ) ( )( )DBDAP αααα −+−+= 1,1  for any lotteries A,B,C,D∈ℒ, BA ≠ , and any ( ]1,0∈α . 
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Axiom 4 states that binary choice probabilities are independent of the consequences 
that are common to both choice alternatives. In other words, if two lotteries yield identical 
chances of the same outcome (or, more generally, if two compound lotteries yield identical 
chances of the same risky lottery) this common consequence does not affect the probability 
of one alternative being chosen over the other.  
Axiom 4 is weaker than the stochastic analogue of the independence axiom of 
expected utility theory, which requires that ( ) ( ) ( )( )CBCAPBAP αααα −+−+= 1,1,  for 
any A,B,C∈ℒ, BA ≠ , and any ( ]1,0∈α . Thus, common consequence independence is 
compatible with several well-known empirical violations of expected utility theory. For 
example, Axiom 4 allows certain types of the common ratio effect (Loomes, 2005) as well 
as the violations of the betweenness property (Blavatskyy, 2006a). Blavatskyy (2008) 
shows that common consequence independence is a necessary axiom for the Fechner model 
of random errors, the Luce choice model and the constant error/tremble model. 
Proposition 1 If Axioms 1, 2a, 3 and 4 hold then there exists an assignment of real 
numbers iu  to every outcome ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , such that P(A,B)=0.5 if and only if 
∑∑ == = ni iini ii buau 11  for any two lotteries ( ) ( )∈nn bbBaaA ,...,,,..., 11 ℒ, BA ≠ . 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
The assignment of real numbers ( )nuu ,...,1  is unique up to a linear transformation. 
If a vector ( )nuu ,...,1=u  represents binary choice probabilities of 0.5 then another vector 
mk +u , 0≠k , does as well. The vector of real numbers ( )nuu ,...,1  can be interpreted as a 
vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
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Axiom 5 (Outcome Monotonicity) ( )( ) { }1,01, ∈−+ jii XXXP αα  for any 
{ }nji ,...,1, ∈ , ji ≠  and any [ )1,0∈α . 
If we set 0=α  then Axiom 5 states that choice under certainty is deterministic. If 
an individual faces a choice between two sure things, then he always chooses the same 
alternative. This is particularly appealing when lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs and 
people care for money. For instance, it appears quite intuitive that a sure prospect of 
receiving £30 is always chosen over a sure prospect of receiving £10.1  
More generally, Axiom 5 states that choice between a sure outcome and a binary 
lottery that involves this outcome is deterministic. Again this is quite intuitive if lottery 
outcomes can be ordered in a natural way. For instance, a prospect of a healthy life is 
always preferred over a medical treatment that provides full recovery with probability α<1. 
Axiom 5 is a weaker version of the principle of internality, which is used in several models 
of probabilistic choice (e.g. Blavatskyy 2006b; 2007) and appears to be descriptively valid.2  
If Axioms 1, 2b and 5 hold, then, without loss of generality, we can number lottery 
outcomes so that ( ) 1, =ji XXP  if ji > , for any { }nji ,...,1, ∈ . 
Definition 1 Lottery ( )∈naaA ,...,1 ℒ weakly dominates lottery ( )∈nbbB ,...,1 ℒ, 
denoted as A B, if ∑∑ == ≤ ji iji i ba 11  for any { }nj ,...,1∈ . 
Our definition of weak dominance is closely related to the concept of stochastic 
dominance for lotteries over monetary outcomes. If lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs, 
then lottery A first-order stochastically dominates lottery B if and only if A B and BA ≠ . 
                                                 
1 In fact, it is so intuitive that I am not aware of a single experimental study that attempts to test this. 
2 I know only one study, Gneezy et al. (2006), that reports violations of internality in indirect choice and 
pricing tasks. Recently, Ortmann et al. (2007) argued that the results of Gneezy et al. (2006) may be an 
artifact of a between-subject experimental design. In a private correspondence, Gneezy et al. (2006) informed 
me that they did not find violations of internality in a direct binary choice. 
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Proposition 2 If Axioms 1, 2b, 3-5 hold then P(A,B)=1 for any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ 
such that A B and BA ≠ . 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
If lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs, Proposition 2 states that people never 
violate first-order stochastic dominance. Experimental evidence shows that people seldom 
violate transparent stochastic dominance. For instance, Carbone and Hey (1995) find only 
one violation of transparent dominance in 320 decisions (rate of violation 0.3%). Loomes 
and Sugden (1998) discover 12 such violations in 920 choice decisions (rate of violation 
1.3%). Hey (2001) reports 24 violations of transparent dominance in 1590 choice decisions 
(rate of violation 1.5%). Loomes et al. (2002) argue that such rare instances can result from 
a lapse of concentration and they can be captured by adding a tremble term to the core 
model of probabilistic choice.  
Experimental evidence shows that people can violate stochastic dominance much 
more frequently if two lotteries are framed so that the dominance relation is not transparent 
(e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Birnbaum, 2004; 2005a; 2005b). However, such 
violations appear to result from improper understanding of a decision problem. When the 
same binary choice problem is presented in a different format so that the dominance 
relation becomes transparent, the rates of violation significantly decrease (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986; Birnbaum, 2004). Hence, the implications of Proposition 2 appear to be 
descriptively acceptable provided that people comprehend stochastic dominance when they 
face it. 
Proposition 3 The partially ordered set (ℒ, ) is a lattice. 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
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Proposition 3 states that for any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ there exists a least upper 
bound, denoted by BA∨ , and a greatest lower bound, denoted by BA∧ . One can argue 
that lotteries BA∨  and BA∧  form a natural context for a binary choice problem because 
they are the best and the worst prospect that an individual can possibly obtain from a given 
decision problem.3 Marley (1997) discusses the role of such natural contextual reference 
points in different models of probabilistic choice.  
Axiom 6 (Odds Ratio Independence) For any three lotteries A,B,C∈ℒ such that 
BA ≠ , CA ≠  and CABA ∧=∧  the odds ratio ( )( )
( )
( )ACP
CAP
ABP
BAP
,
,
,
,  is independent of A. 
Axiom 6 can be illustrated with the following example. Consider an individual who 
chooses where to go for lunch. There are three restaurants close to his office. An Egyptian 
bistro is located around the corner. There are also Thai and Swiss restaurants, both of which 
are two blocks away. If we compare the relative chance that the Egyptian restaurant is 
chosen over the Thai restaurant with the relative chance that the Egyptian restaurant is 
chosen over the Swiss restaurant, this odds ratio should depend only on the characteristics 
of Thai and Swiss restaurants and it should not depend on the characteristics of the 
Egyptian bistro. 
Intuitively, Axiom 6 plays the role of an exchange rate. Axiom 6 allows us to bring 
various choice probabilities to a common denominator. Such an axiom is not required in 
traditional deterministic decision theories because they deal with degenerate choice 
probabilities that take only two values—either one or zero. Since Axiom 6 is a new axiom 
that is not used in the existing axiomatic models of probabilistic choice, I am not aware of 
any empirical tests of Axiom 6. 
                                                 
3 This interpretation was suggested to me by Tony Marley. 
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III. Representation Theorem 
Proposition 4 The binary choice probability function P:ℒ¯ℒ→[0,1] satisfies 
Axioms 1-6 if and only if there exists an assignment of real numbers iu  to every outcome 
ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , and there exists a non-decreasing function :+→+ with ( ) 00 =ϕ , such 
that for any two lotteries ( ) ( )∈nn bbBaaA ,...,,,..., 11 ℒ, BA ≠ , the probability P(A,B) can be 
written as  
(2) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∑∑∑∑ ∑∑ ==== == −+−
−= n
i ii
n
i ii
n
i ii
n
i ii
n
i ii
n
i ii
cubucuau
cuau
BAP
1111
11, ϕϕ
ϕ
, 
where { } { }∑∑∑∑ −=−=== −= 111111 ,max,max ij jij jij jij ji babac . 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
When lottery outcomes are monetary payoffs, formula (2) implies that P(A,B)=1 if 
A stochastically dominates B,4 and that P(A,B)=0 if B stochastically dominates A.5 Formula 
(2) also implies that P(A,B)=0.5 if the expected utility of lottery A is exactly equal to the 
expected utility of lottery B.  
Note that lottery BA∧  yields outcome ix  with probability ic , { }ni ,...,1∈ .6 Thus, 
one possible interpretation of model (2) is the following. Lotteries A and B are evaluated 
relative to the endogenous reference lottery, which is their greatest lower bound BA∧ . 
The closer is lottery A (B) to the reference lottery BA∧  in terms of expected utility, the 
closer is binary choice probability P(A,B) to zero (one). Function (.) captures the 
sensitivity of binary choice probabilities to changes in the expected utility of lotteries 
relative to the endogenous reference lottery. 
                                                 
4 In this case ii bc =  for all { }ni ,...,1∈ . 
5 In this case ii ac =  for all { }ni ,...,1∈ . 
6 See proof of Proposition 3. 
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Models of probabilistic choice can be conveniently presented in the probability 
triangle (e.g. Machina, 1982). When lotteries have no more than three outcomes (n=3), the 
set of all lotteries ℒ can be represented as a rectangular triangle. The probability of the first 
outcome (b1) is conventionally shown on the horizontal axis. The probability of the third 
outcome (b3) is typically shown on the vertical axis. We will select an arbitrary lottery A 
inside the probability triangle and then plot the set of all other lotteries B such that P(A,B) is 
constant. 
Figure 1 shows “probabilistic indifference sets” {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=r} for a selected 
lottery A∈ℒ and various choice probabilities r∈[0,1]. Figure 1a) provides an illustration for 
a constant error/tremble model. In a constant error/tremble model, the probability r can take 
only three possible values. Figure 1b) illustrates the Fechner model of random errors and 
the Luce choice model.7 In these two models the sets {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=r} are parallel straight 
lines with a positive slope. Figure 1c) illustrates a random utility model. The random utility 
model is a special case of equation (2) if the function (.) is homogeneous and lotteries 
have up to three outcomes.8 
Figure 1d) illustrates the model of probabilistic choice described in equation (2) 
when the function (.) is not homogeneous. Note that in model (2) the set {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=r} 
is a straight line with a positive slope only if r=0.5. The set {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=1} contains all 
lotteries that are stochastically dominated by A. Similarly, the set {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=0} contains 
all lotteries that stochastically dominate lottery A. 
                                                 
7 We can obtain the Luce choice model from formula (2) if we assume that function (.) is the exponential 
function. However, the Luce choice model is not a special case of our proposed model of probabilistic choice 
because the exponential function does not satisfy the boundary condition ( ) 00 =ϕ . 
8 When lotteries have more than three outcomes neither the random utility model nor the model presented in 
equation (2) are special cases of each other. 
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a) Constant error/tremble model    b) Fechner model/Luce choice model 
   
c) Random utility/Model (2), (.) is homogeneous d) Model (2), (.) is not homogeneous 
Figure 1 Models of probabilistic choice presented in the probability triangle.  
The set ℒ of all lotteries that yield no more than three outcomes is represented by a 
rectangular triangle. The probability of the first outcome ( 1b ) is shown on the 
horizontal axis. The probability of the third outcome ( 3b ) is shown on the vertical axis. 
Each panel shows the sets {B∈ℒ|P(A,B)=r} for one lottery A∈ℒ and various choice 
probabilities [ ]1,0∈r . 
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Nonlinearity of choice probabilities illustrated by Figure 1d) suggests that model (2) 
can explain some violations of expected utility theory if the function (.) is not 
homogeneous. For instance, model (2) is compatible with certain types of the common ratio 
effect as well as with violations of the betweenness property. 
The common ratio effect is typically illustrated with lotteries over three monetary 
outcomes x3>x2>x1=0. The effect is observed when P(A,B)>P(C,D) for lotteries A(0,1,0), 
B(1-q,0,q), C(1-θ,θ,0), D(1-θq,0,θq), and probabilities q,θ∈(0,1) (e.g. Allais, 1953). If 
choice probabilities admit representation (2) then P(A,B)>P(C,D) if the following holds: 
(3) 
( )( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
( )( )23
12
23
12 11
uuq
uuq
uuq
uuq
−
−−>−
−−
θϕ
θϕ
ϕ
ϕ
. 
If function (.) is homogeneous then the left hand side and the right hand side of (3) are 
exactly equal. In this case model (2) coincides with a random utility model, which cannot 
explain the common ratio effect. However, if function (.) is not homogeneous then 
inequality (3) may easily hold. 
 The violations of the betweenness property are usually illustrated with two lotteries 
A and B, A≠B, and a compound lottery ( )BAM αα −+= 1 , ( )1,0∈α . An individual is said 
to reveal quasi-concave preferences if he chooses A over B and M over A. An individual is 
said to reveal quasi-convex preferences if he chooses B over A and A over M. Systematic 
violations of the betweenness are observed when people reveal quasi-concave preferences 
more often than quasi-convex preferences or vice versa (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994). If 
binary choices are independent then the violations of the betweenness are observed if 
P(A,B)≠P(A,M). If choice probabilities admit representation (2) then P(A,B)≠P(A,M) if and 
only if the following condition holds: 
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(4) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )BAUBU
BAUAU
BAUBU
BAUAU
∧−⋅−
∧−⋅−≠∧−
∧−
αϕ
αϕ
ϕ
ϕ
1
1 , 
where U(.) denotes the expected utility of a corresponding lottery. If the function (.) is not 
homogeneous then condition (4) holds for at least one pair of lotteries A and B. Thus, model 
(2) is compatible with the violations of the betweenness property. 
It is interesting to note that for any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ a compound lottery 
0.5A+0.5B is equivalent to a compound lottery ( ) ( )BABA ∧+∨ 5.05.0 . This implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BAUBAUBUAU ∧+∨=+  and we can rewrite equation (2) as follows: 
(5) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).
,
BUBAUAUBAU
BUBAU
BAUBUBAUAU
BAUAUBAP
−∨+−∨
−∨=
=∧−+∧−
∧−=
ϕϕ
ϕ
ϕϕ
ϕ
 
Thus, in this model, we can compare lotteries relative to their greatest lower bound, or, 
equivalently, relative to their least upper bound. The closer is lottery A (B) to lottery BA∨  
in terms of expected utility, the closer is binary choice probability P(A,B) to one (zero). 
A natural extension of this model is to weaken the axiom of common consequence 
independence to accommodate, for example, choice patterns observed in the Allais paradox 
(Allais, 1953). Axiom 4 can be replaced by the axioms of non-expected utility theories, 
provided that these axioms are reformulated in terms of a primitive binary choice 
probability function rather than a primitive binary preference relation. However, such 
extensions may require different binary operations ∨  and ∧  on ℒ than those derived from 
the partial order . Operations ∨  and ∧  derived from  are linear in probabilities, which is 
a convenient property in conjunction with Axiom 4, but it may be unnecessary if Axiom 4 
is relaxed.  
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IV. Choice among m>2 alternatives 
A model of binary choice can be generalized to choice among m>2 alternatives. 
Luce and Suppes (1965, pp. 351-352) give an example of the following algorithm. When 
choosing among m>2 alternatives, an individual first selects two alternatives at random and 
chooses between them. The chosen alternative is then compared to another randomly 
selected alternative. This step is subsequently repeated i.e. the individual chooses between a 
previously chosen alternative and another randomly selected element of the choice set 
S={A1,…,Am}. Let Q(Ai|S)t denote the probability that the i-th alternative Ai, i∈{1,…,m}, is 
chosen over another randomly selected alternative at the iteration t∈ℕ of this algorithm. 
Probabilities Q(Ai|S)t are recursively defined by the following system of equations: 
(6) 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−=
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∑
∑
∑
≠=
≠
=
≠
=
+
+
+
tm
t
t
m
mi
i
immm
m
m
i
i
i
m
m
i
i
i
tm
t
t
SAQ
SAQ
SAQ
AAPAAPAAP
AAPAAPAAP
AAPAAPAAP
m
SAQ
SAQ
SAQ
K
K
KOKK
K
K
K
2
1
1
21
2
2
1
212
121
1
1
1
1
12
11
,,,
,,,
,,,
1
1  
with the initial condition Q(Ai|S)1 =1/m for all i∈{1,…,m}. 
The probability that Ai is chosen from the set S is defined as ( ) ( )titi SAQSAQ ∞→≡ lim  
for all i∈{1,…,m}. In other words, we calculate the chance that an individual chooses the i-
th alternative from the set S as if the individual continues the sequence of binary choices 
described above ad infinitum. A vector Q = (Q(A1|S), …, Q(Am|S))´ is an asymptotic 
probability distribution on S, which solves the following homogeneous matrix equation 
(7) ( )( ) 01 =⋅−− QIΡ m , 
where P is a transition matrix on the right-hand side of (6) and I is the m×m identity matrix. 
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Before presenting a solution to (7), it is convenient to introduce the following 
notation. Let G denote an arborescence with the vertex set S and let Γ (S) be the set of all 
arborescences with the vertex set S. Let R(G) be the root of G and let E(G) be the edge set 
of G. Note that the elements of E(G) are ordered pairs of lotteries {A,B} such that A,B∈S 
and A≠B. The product ( ){ } ( )∏ ∈ GEBA BAP, ,  is the probability that an individual chooses the 
initial vertex (tail) A over the terminal vertex (head) B in all edges of an arborescence G. 
With this notation, vector Q that solves (7) can be written as 
(8) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( )( )′= ∑ ∏∑ ∏ =Γ∈ ∈=Γ∈ ∈ mAGRSG GEBAAGRSG GEBA BAPBAP ,, ,,...,,1λQ , 
where λ is an arbitrary constant. 
Since choice probabilities should add up to one, i.e. ( ) 1
1
=∑ =mi i SAQ , it follows 
immediately that ( ){ } ( )( )∑ ∏Γ∈ ∈= SG GEBA BAP, ,1λ . Thus, an individual chooses a lottery 
Ai∈S from a non-singleton choice set S with a probability  
(9) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )∑ ∏
∑ ∏
Γ∈ ∈
=Γ∈ ∈=
SG GEBA
AGRSG GEBA
i BAP
BAP
SAQ i
,
,
,
,
, 
where binary choice probabilities P(A,B) are given in equation (5) and i∈{1,…,m}. 
Equation (9) allows us to generalize any model of binary choice to choice among 
m>2 alternatives and it has several intuitive properties. For example, if an individual always 
(never) chooses one lottery over every other element of a choice set in a direct binary 
choice, then he also always (never) chooses this lottery from the overall choice set. If an 
individual chooses with probabilities 50%-50% between any two lotteries from a given 
choice set, then each lottery is selected with equal probability (1/m) from this choice set. 
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V. Conclusion 
This paper presents a simple axiomatic model of decision making under risk. In this 
model, when it comes to choosing one lottery over another, each alternative has a chance of 
being selected, unless one lottery stochastically dominates the other. It is straightforward to 
apply the proposed model in empirical research. In order to estimate a binary choice 
probability a researcher needs to calculate only the expected utilities of three lotteries—the 
two lotteries that are compared and their greatest lower bound (or their least upper bound) 
in terms of weak dominance. The greatest lower bound or the least upper bound serves as a 
natural endogenous reference lottery to which lotteries are compared. 
The representation theorem shows that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the model are four relatively standard axioms (completeness, weak stochastic transitivity, 
continuity and common consequence independence) and two relatively new axioms 
(outcome monotonicity and odds ratio independence). Outcome monotonicity requires that 
choice under certainty is deterministic. Odds ratio independence connects binary choice 
probabilities of different values. Both standard and new axioms are formulated in terms of a 
primitive binary choice probability function. Thus, they can be easily tested on 
experimental data. 
The proposed model is compatible with several well-known violations of expected 
utility theory. In particular, the model can accommodate the common ratio effect and 
violations of the betweenness. The proposed model is also quite general. It can be applied 
to a variety of choice situations, where lottery outcomes are not necessarily monetary 
payoffs. Finally, although the baseline model is developed for binary choice, it can be 
easily extended to choice situations where a decision maker faces m>2 alternatives. 
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Appendix 
Before we prove Proposition 1, it is convenient to prove the following two lemmas. 
Lemma A1 If Axioms 1-4 hold then P(A,0.5A+0.5B)=0.5 for any two lotteries 
A,B∈ℒ such that BA ≠  and P(A,B)=0.5. 
Axiom 4 implies that P(A,0.5A+0.5B)=P(0.5A+0.5B,B). Let us denote this probability 
by q. Suppose first that q≥0.5.  If P(B,A)≥0.5 and P(A,0.5A+0.5B)≥0.5 then Axiom 2a 
implies that P(B,0.5A+0.5B)≥0.5. Axiom 1 implies that P(B,0.5A+0.5B)=1-q. Since q≥0.5 
and 1-q≥0.5 it must be the case that q=0.5.  
Similarly, if q≤0.5 then P(B,0.5A+0.5B)=1-q≥0.5. If P(A,B)≥0.5 and 
P(B,0.5A+0.5B)≥0.5 then Axiom 2a implies that P(A,0.5A+0.5B)≥0.5. If 1-q≥0.5 and q≥0.5 
it must be the case that q=0.5. This completes the proof of Lemma A1. 
Lemma A2 If Axioms 1-4 hold then ( )( ) 5.01, ≥−+ BAAP αα  and 
( )( ) 5.01, ≤−+ BABP αα  for any probability ( )1,0∈α  and any two lotteries A,B∈ℒ such 
that BA ≠  and P(A,B)≥0.5. 
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there is ( )1,0∈α  such that ( )( ) 5.01, <−+ BAAP αα . 
We will construct a sequence { }∞=1kkα  such that αα =∞→ kklim  and ( )( ) 5.01, =−+ BAAP kk αα  
for every k∈ℕ. Axiom 3 implies that the sets [ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, ,0 ≥−+∈ BAAP ββαβ  and 
[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, ,0 ≤−+∈ BAAP ββαβ  are closed. Axiom 1 guarantees that every [ ]αβ ,0∈  
belongs to at least one of these two sets. Since both sets are nonempty ( 0=β  belongs to 
the first set and αβ =  belongs to the second set), there is at least one β~  that belongs to 
both sets. This is the first element of our sequence βα ~1 = .  
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If ( )( ) 5.01, 11 =−+ BAAP αα  then ( ) ( )( ) 5.015.015.0, 11 =−++ BAAP αα  due to 
Lemma A1. The second element of our sequence is ( )12 15.0 αα += . If αα =2  then we 
have an immediate contradiction to our initial assumption that ( )( ) 5.01, <−+ BAAP αα . If 
αα <2  then the third element of our sequence is ( )23 15.0 αα += .9 If αα >2  then the 
third element of our sequence is ( )213 5.0 ααα += .10 By continuing in this fashion ad 
infinitum, we construct sequence { }∞=1kkα  that is recursively defined by 
( ) kkk 21 11 ααα −+=+  if α<ka  and ( ) kkk 21 11 ααα −−=+  if α>ka , k∈ℕ.  
Axiom 3 implies that the sets { }[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, max,0 ≥−+∈
∈
BAAPkk ββαβ N  and 
{ }[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, max,0 ≤−+∈
∈
BAAPkk ββαβ N  are closed. Each element of the sequence 
{ }∞=1kkα  belongs to both of these sets. Hence, the limit of the sequence αα =∞→ kklim  also 
belongs to both of these sets. This implies that ( )( ) 5.01, =−+ BAAP αα . However, this 
contradicts to our initial assumption that ( )( ) 5.01, <−+ BAAP αα . We arrive at a similar 
contradiction if we assume that there exists ( )1,0∈α  such that ( )( ) 5.01, >−+ BABP αα . 
This completes the proof of Lemma A2. 
                                                 
9 If ( )( ) 5.01, 22 =−+ BAAP αα  then ( ) ( )( ) 5.015.015.0, 22 =−++ BAAP αα  due to Lemma A1. 
10 If ( )( ) 5.01, 11 =−+ BAAP αα  and ( )( ) 5.01, 22 =−+ BAAP αα  then Axiom 2a implies that ( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 2211 =−+−+ BABAP αααα . If the latter equality holds then Lemma A1 implies that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.05.015.0,1 212111 =+−++−+ BABAP αααααα .  If ( )( ) 5.01, 11 =−+ BAAP αα  
and  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.05.015.0,1 212111 =+−++−+ BABAP αααααα  then Axiom 2a implies that ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.05.015.0, 2121 =+−++ BAAP αααα . 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Since X is a finite set, Axioms 1 and 2a imply that the elements of X can be ordered 
so that ( ) 5.0, ≥ji XXP  if ji > , for any { }nji ,...,1, ∈ . We will now prove Proposition 1 in 
several steps. 
Step 1. Prove that ( ) 5.0, ≥AXP n  and ( ) 5.0,1 ≤AXP  for any A(a1,…,an)∈ℒ such 
that 1XA ≠  and nXA ≠ .  
Proof by mathematical induction. If 2=n  then Lemma A2 immediately implies 
that ( )( ) 5.01, 12222 ≥−+ XaXaXP  and ( )( ) 5.01, 12221 ≤−+ XaXaXP  for any probability 
( )1,02 ∈a . Let us now assume that the statement holds for any 1−≤ kn  and let us prove 
that it also holds for kn = . Note that lottery A(a1,…,ak) can be written as a compound 
lottery ( )AaXa kkk ′−+ 1 , where lottery A′  is ( ) ( )( )0,1,...,1 11 kkk aaaa −− − . Since 
( ) 5.0,1 ≥′− AXP k  due to the assumption of mathematical induction and ( ) 5.0, 1 ≥−kk XXP  
because of the assumed ordering of outcomes, Axiom 2a implies that ( ) 5.0, ≥′AXP k . 
Lemma A2 then implies that  ( )( ) 5.01, ≥′−+ AaXaXP kkkk  for any ( )1,0∈ka . Similarly, 
we can show that ( ) 5.0,1 ≤AXP  if lottery A(a1,…,ak) is written as a compound lottery 
( )AaXa ′′−+ 111 1 , where lottery A ′′  is ( ) ( )( )112 1,...,1,0 aaaa k −− .  
Step 2. Prove Proposition 1 in case when ( ) 5.0, 1 =XXP n .  
In step 1 we already established that ( ) 5.0, ≥AXP n  for any A∈ℒ, nXA ≠ . Since 
( ) 5.0,1 =nXXP  and ( ) 5.0, ≥AXP n , Axiom 2a implies that ( ) 5.0,1 ≥AXP . However, we 
already established that ( ) 5.0,1 ≤AXP  in step 1. Therefore, it must be the case that 
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( ) 5.0,1 =AXP  for any A∈ℒ, 1XA ≠ . If ( ) 5.0, 1 =XAP  and ( ) 5.0,1 =BXP  for any A,B∈ℒ, 
1, XBA ≠ , Axiom 2a implies that ( ) 5.0, =BAP  for any A,B∈ℒ, BA ≠ . These degenerate 
choice probabilities can be represented by assignment 0=iu , { }ni ,...,1∈ . Therefore, we 
will now consider only the case when ( ) 5.0, 1 >XXP n . 
Step 3. Prove that for any A∈ℒ such that ( ) 11 XXA n αα −+≠  for some [ ]1,0∈α , 
there is a unique [ ]1,0∈Aα  such that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXAP AnA αα . 
Axiom 3 implies that the sets [ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 1 ≥−+∈ XXAP n ααα  and 
[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 1 ≤−+∈ XXAP n ααα  are closed. Axiom 1 guarantees that every [ ]1,0∈α  
belongs to at least one of these two sets. Since both sets are nonempty ( 0=α  belongs to 
the first set and 1=α  belongs to the second set), there is at least one [ ]1,0∈Aα  that 
belongs to both sets. Let us now prove that Aα  is unique. 
Suppose there is AA αβ ≠  such that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXAP AnA ββ . Without loss of 
generality, let us assume that AA αβ >  and let us denote the difference AA αβ −  with δ . If 
( )( ) 5.0,1 1 =−+ AXXP AnA ββ  and ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXAP AnA αα  then Axiom 2a implies 
that ( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 11 =−+−+ XXXXP AnAAnA ααββ . Axiom 4 then immediately implies 
that ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 5.0,11,1 1111 =−+=−+−+ XXXPXXXXP nAnAAnA δδααββ . If 
( )( ) 5.0,1 11 =−+ XXXP n δδ  then ( ) ( )( ) 5.01,212 11 =−+−+ XXXXP nn δδδδ  due to 
Axiom 4 and ( )( ) 5.0,212Pr 11 =−+ XXX n δδ  due to Axiom 2a. Applying this 
reasoning { }δβ Ak int=  times we obtain that ( )( ) 5.0,1 11 =−+ XXkXkP n δδ . 
 27
Similarly, Axiom 4 implies that ( ) ( )( ) =−+−+ 11 1,1 XXXXP AnAAnA ααββ  
( )( ) 5.01, 1 =+−= XXXP nn δδ . If ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =+− XXXP nn δδ  then Axiom 4 implies that 
( ) ( )( ) 5.0221,1 11 =+−+− XXXXP nn δδδδ  and Axiom 2a subsequently implies that 
( )( ) 5.0221, 1 =+− XXXP nn δδ . Applying this reasoning ( ){ }δα Am −= 1int  times we 
obtain that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =+− XmXmXP nn δδ . If lottery ( ) 11 XmXm n δδ +−  coincides with 
lottery ( ) 11 XkXk n δδ −+  then Axiom 2a implies that ( ) 5.0, 1 =XXP n . However, we 
already considered this case in step 2. Thus, let us consider the case when 
( ) 11 XmXm n δδ +−  is not the same lottery as ( ) 11 XkXk n δδ −+ . 
Since ( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 11 =−+−+ XXXXP AnAAnA ααββ  Lemma A2 implies that 
( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 11 =−+−+ XXXXP nAnA ααββ  for any ( )AA βαα ,∈ . Axiom 2a then implies 
that ( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 11 =−+−+ XXXXP nn ββαα  for any [ ]AA βαβα ,, ∈ , βα ≠ . Since 
[ ]AAk βαδ ,∈  and [ ]AAm βαδ ,1 ∈−  by our choice of integers k  and m  it follows that 
( ) ( )( ) 5.01,1 11 =−++− XkXkXmXmP nn δδδδ . Since we already established that 
( )( ) 5.01, 1 =+− XmXmXP nn δδ  and ( )( ) 5.0,1 11 =−+ XXkXkP n δδ , Axiom 2a then 
implies that ( ) 5.0, 1 =XXP n . However, we already considered this case in step 2. 
Therefore, it must be the case that LL αβ = . 
Step 4. Prove that for any A∈ℒ there is a unique number U(A) such that P(A,B)=0.5 
if and only if U(A)=U(B) for any B∈ℒ, BA ≠ . 
Let us assign a number U(A) to any lottery A∈ℒ in the following manner. If 
( ) 11 XXA n αα −+=  for some [ ]1,0∈α  then let ( ) α=AU . If ( ) 11 XXA n αα −+≠  for any 
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[ ]1,0∈α  then there is a unique [ ]1,0∈Aα  such that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXAP AnA αα  by step 
3 and let ( ) AAU α= . Let us now prove that such assignment meets our goal. If P(A,B)=0.5 
and ( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+=  then U(A)=U(B) because we proved in step 3 that there is 
only one [ ]1,0∈Bα  such that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXBP BnB αα . If P(A,B)=0.5 and 
( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+≠  then ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XAUXAUAP n . In this case if 
( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+= , then it must be the case that U(A)=U(B) because we proved in 
step 3 that there is only one [ ]1,0∈Aα  such that ( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XXAP AnA αα . If 
( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+≠ , then Axiom 2a implies that ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XAUXAUBP n  
and again it must be the case that U(A)=U(B). 
If U(A)=U(B) and ( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+=  then we can write 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) 5.0,1, 1 ==−+ ABPXBUXBUBP n . If U(A)=U(B) and ( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+≠  
then we can write ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01,1, 11 =−+=−+ XBUXBUAPXAUXAUAP nn . In 
this case if ( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+=  then we immediately have ( ) 5.0, =BAP . If 
( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+≠  then we have ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XBUXBUBP n  and 
( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XBUXBUAP n . Axiom 2a then implies that ( ) 5.0, =BAP . 
Step 5. Prove that ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BUAUBAU αααα −+=−+ 11  for any A,B∈ℒ and any 
[ ]1,0∈α . 
If ( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+=  and ( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+=  then ( ) =−+ BA αα 1  
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] +−+=−+−+−+= nnn XBUAUXBUXBUXAUXAU αααα 1111 11  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 111 XBUAU αα −−−+ . Thus, we have ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BUAUBAU αααα −+=−+ 11 . If 
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( ) ( )( ) 11 XAUXAUA n −+≠  then we have ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XAUXAUAP n  and Lemma 
A2 implies that ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01,11 11 =−+−+−+ XAUXAUXAUXAUAP nnαα . 
Axiom 4 then implies ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ]( +−+−+−+ 11 1,11 XAUXAUXBUXBUAP nn ααα  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]) 5.011 1 =−+−+ XBUXBU nα , which can be rearranged into the following 
equation: ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( +−+−+−+ nn XBUAUXBUXBUAP αααα 1,11 1  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ) 5.011 1 =−−−+ XBUAU αα . If ( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+=  we immediately have 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BUAUBAU αααα −+=−+ 11 .  
If ( ) ( )( ) 11 XBUXBUB n −+≠  then  ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01, 1 =−+ XBUXBUBP n  and Lemma 
A2 implies that ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 5.01,11 11 =−+−+−+ XBUXBUBXBUXBUP nn αα . 
Axiom 4 then implies ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]( ) 5.011,1 1 =−+−+−+ XBUXBUABAP nαααα . 
Axiom 2a then implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 5.0111,1 1 =−−−+−+−+ XBUAUXBUAUBAP n αααααα . Thus, 
we have again ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BUAUBAU αααα −+=−+ 11 . 
Hence, if we set ( )ii XUu =  then P(A,B)=0.5 if and only if ∑∑ == = ni iini ii buau 11  
for any two lotteries ( ) ( )∈nn bbBaaA ,...,,,..., 11 ℒ, BA ≠ . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proof by mathematical induction. Let us first prove Proposition 2 for lotteries with 
only two outcomes. In this case lottery ( ) 2111 1 XaXaA −+≡  weakly dominates lottery 
( ) 2111 1 XbXbB −+≡  if 11 ba ≤ . Since BA ≠ , it must be that 11 ba < . Axiom 4 implies that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )211111221112111 1,1,1, XabXabXPXbXbXaXaPBAP +−+−=−+−+= . 
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Axiom 5 implies that ( ) ( )( ) { }1,01, 2111112 ∈+−+− XabXabXP . Let us now prove that this 
probability cannot be equal to zero. We will construct a sequence { }∞=1kkα  such that 
11lim abkk −=∞→ α  and ( )( ) 11, 212 =−+ XXXP kk αα  for every k∈ℕ. The first element of our 
sequence is 5.01 =α . Let us prove that ( ) 15.05.0, 212 =+ XXXP . Axiom 5 states that 
( )212 5.05.0, XXXP +  is either zero or one. If ( ) 05.05.0, 212 =+ XXXP  then Axiom 1 
implies that ( ) 1,5.05.0 221 =+ XXXP . If ( ) 1,5.05.0 221 =+ XXXP  then Axiom 4 implies 
that ( ) 15.05.0, 211 =+ XXXP . If ( ) 1, 12 =XXP  and ( ) 15.05.0, 211 =+ XXXP  then Axiom 2b 
implies that ( ) 15.05.0, 212 =+ XXXP , which contradicts to our initial assumption that 
( ) 05.05.0, 212 =+ XXXP . Therefore, it must be the case that ( ) 15.05.0, 212 =+ XXXP .  
If 5.011 =− ab  then we immediately have our result that ( )BAP ,  cannot be zero. If 
5.011 >− ab  then the second element of our sequence is 75.02 =α . If 5.011 <− ab  then 
the second element of our sequence is 25.02 =α . Note that ( )( ) 11, 22122 =−+ XXXP αα  
by a similar argument to the one that we established in the previous paragraph for 5.01 =α . 
By continuing in this fashion ad infinitum, we end up with a sequence { }∞=1kkα  that is 
recursively defined by 11 21
+
+ += kkk αα  if 11 abak −<  and 11 21 ++ −= kkk αα  if 
11 abak −> , k∈ℕ. 
Axiom 3 implies that the set { }[ ] ( )( ){ }5.01, 1,min 212 ≥−+∈ ∈ XXXPkk ββαβ N  is closed. 
Each element of the sequence { }∞=1kkα  belongs to this set. Thus, the limit of the sequence 
should be in this set as well. This means that ( ) ( )( ) 5.01, 2111112 ≥+−+− XabXabXP . 
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Thus, this probability cannot be equal to zero and it must be equal to one due to Axiom 5. 
Therefore, we can conclude that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11,, 2111112 =+−+−= XabXabXPBAP . 
Suppose now that Proposition 2 holds for any lotteries with n-1 or less outcomes 
and let us prove that it also holds for lotteries with n outcomes. If lottery ( )naaA ,...,1  
weakly dominated lottery ( )nbbB ,...,1  then 11 ba ≤  and we can apply Axiom 4 as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )nnnn XbXbXabXabXaXaXaaPBAP +++++−++++= ...,..., 3321211133221 .
Note that lottery ( )naaaaC ,...,,,0 321 +  weakly dominated lottery ( )nbbbbD ,...,,,0 321 +  and 
( ) 1, =DCP  due to the assumption of mathematical induction. Axiom 4 implies that lottery 
( )nbbbbD ,...,,,0 321 +  is chosen over lottery ( )nbbababF ,...,,, 31211 +−  with probability 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11,, 2111112 =+−+−= XabXabXPFDP . If ( ) 1, =DCP  and ( ) 1, =FDP  then 
Axiom 2b implies that ( ) 1, =FCP . Since we already established that ( ) ( )FCPBAP ,, = , 
we can conclude that ( ) 1, =BAP . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
For any ( ) ( )∈nn bbBaaA ,...,,,..., 11 ℒ we can construct lottery C that yields outcome 
xi with probability { } { }∑∑∑∑ −=−=== − 111111 ,min,min ij jij jij jij j baba  and lottery D that yields 
outcome xi with probability { } { }∑∑∑∑ −=−=== − 111111 ,max,max ij jij jij jij j baba , { }ni ,...,1∈ . 
Note that C A and C B. Suppose that there is another lottery ( )∈nffF ,...,1 ℒ such that 
F A and F B and C F. Then it must be the case that ∑∑ == ≤ ji iji i af 11 , ∑∑ == ≤ ji iji i bf 11  
and { } ∑∑∑ === ≤ ji iij jij j fba 111 ,min  for any { }nj ,...,1∈ . These three inequalities imply that 
 32
{ }∑∑∑ === = ij jij jji i baf 111 ,min   for any { }nj ,...,1∈  i.e. F=C. In other words, lottery C is a 
least upper bound on A and B. Similarly, we can show that lottery D is a greatest lower 
bound on A and B. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
It is a relatively straightforward algebraic exercise to demonstrate that if binary 
choice probabilities admit representation (2) then they satisfy Axioms 1-6. Therefore, I will 
only prove the sufficiency of Axioms 1-6. 
Consider an arbitrary pair of lotteries A,B∈ℒ such that BA ≠ . Note that if 
BAA ∧=  then ( ) 0, =BAP  due to Proposition 2 and equation (2) holds trivially if we set 
( ) 00 =ϕ  (in this case ii ac =  for all { }ni ,...,1∈ ). Similarly, if BAB ∧=  then ( ) 1, =BAP  
due to Proposition 2 and equation (2) holds trivially (in this case ii bc =  for all { }ni ,...,1∈ ). 
Therefore, we need to consider only the case when BAA ∧≠  and BAB ∧≠ . 
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that ( ) 21, ≤BAP . If Axiom 6 holds, then 
there is a function  f:ℒ¯ℒ¯ℒ→+ such that 
(10) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )BACBfACP
CAP
ABP
BAP ∧= ,,
,
,
,
, , 
where C∈ℒ is an arbitrary lottery such that CA ≠  and CABA ∧=∧ . Let us prove 
Proposition 4 in several steps. 
Step 1. Prove that function f has the following form ( ) ( )( )BAB
BACBACBf ∧
∧=∧
,
,,, ϕ
ϕ . 
Since equation (10) holds for any C∈ℒ such that CA ≠  and CABA ∧=∧  we can 
write it for another lottery D∈ℒ such that DA ≠  and DABA ∧=∧ : 
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(11) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )BADBfADP
DAP
ABP
BAP ∧= ,,
,
,
,
, . 
We can also substitute lottery B with lottery D in equation (10) and obtain: 
(12) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )BACDfACP
CAP
ADP
DAP ∧= ,,
,
,
,
, . 
If we multiply equation (11) on equation (12) and use the identity in equation (10), we 
obtain: 
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )BACDfBADBfBACBf ∧⋅∧=∧ ,,,,,, . 
Equation (13) is a generalized multiplicative Sincov functional equation (e.g. Aczél, 
1966). Function f(.) is a solution to (13) if and only if there exists a function :ℒ¯ℒ→+  
such that ( ) ( ) ( )BABBACBACBf ∧∧=∧ ,,,, ϕϕ . 
If Axioms 1-4 hold then Proposition 1 implies that there is an assignment of real 
numbers iu  to every outcome ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , such that ( ) 5.0, =BAP  if and only if 
∑∑ == = ni iini ii buau 11  for any two lotteries ( ) ( )∈nn bbBaaA ,...,,,..., 11 ℒ, BA ≠ . Let 
function U:ℒ → be the expected utility function i.e. ( ) ∑ =≡ ni ii auAU 1  for any 
( )∈naaA ,...,1 ℒ. 
Step 2. Prove that function  has the following form ( ) ( )( )BAAUBAA ∧=∧ ,, ϕϕ . 
Axiom 3 implies that the sets [ ] ( )( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 ≥∧−+∈ BABAP ααα  and 
[ ] ( )( )( ){ }5.01, 1,0 ≤∧−+∈ BABAP ααα  are closed. Both sets are non-empty ( 0=α  
belongs to the first set due to Proposition 2 and 1=α  belongs to the second set, because we 
assumed that ( ) 21, ≤BAP ). Hence, there is [ ]1,0∈Aα  that belongs to both sets i.e. 
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( )( )( ) 5.01, =∧−+ BABAP AA αα . According to Proposition 1 the latter equality holds if 
and only if ( )( )( ) ( )AUBABU AA =∧−+ αα 1 . This implies that probability Aα  is unique 
and it is equal to ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU ∧−∧− . Let ( ) BABF AA ∧−+≡ αα 1 . 
Note that ( )[ ] BABABAFA AA ∧=∧−+∧=∧ αα 1  and ( ) ( ) 5.0,, == AFPFAP  
due to Axiom 1. Thus, we can substitute lottery C with lottery F in equation (10) and 
obtain: 
(14) ( )( )
( )
( )BAB
BAF
ABP
BAP
∧
∧=
,
,
5.0
5.0
,
,
ϕ
ϕ . 
Equation (14) holds for any A,B∈ℒ such that BABA ∧≠≠  and a lottery F∈ℒ such 
that BAFA ∧=∧  and ( ) ( )AUFU = . Since lottery F is unique, we can write ( )FU  
instead of F in the right hand side of (14). Moreover, since ( ) ( )AUFU = , we can write just 
( )AU  in the right hand side of (14), which gives the following result: 
(15) ( )( )
( )( )
( )BAB
BAAU
ABP
BAP
∧
∧=
,
,
,
,
ϕ
ϕ . 
By a symmetry argument we can conclude that ( ) ( )( )BABUBAB ∧=∧ ,, ϕϕ . 
Axiom 1 implies that ( ) ( )BAPABP ,1, −= . Plugging this result into (15), we obtain: 
(16) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )BABUBAAU
BAAUBAP ∧+∧
∧=
,,
,, ϕϕ
ϕ . 
Step 3. Prove that function  has the form ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUAUBAAU ∧−=∧ ϕϕ , . 
First of all, since lottery BA∧  is unique for all A,B∈ℒ we can write ( )BAU ∧  
instead of BA∧  in the right-hand side of (16). Axiom 4 implies that for any lotteries 
A,B,C∈ℒ, BA ≠ , the choice probability ( )CBCAP 5.05.0,5.05.0 ++  does not depend on C. 
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Note that [ ] [ ] ( ) CBACBCA 5.05.05.05.05.05.0 +∧=+∧+ . Using equation (16) we can 
write: 
(17) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∧++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∧+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∧+
=
=++
CUBAUCUBUCUBAUCUAU
CUBAUCUAU
CBCAP
2
1
2
1,
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1,
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1,
2
1
2
1
5.05.0,5.05.0
ϕϕ
ϕ . 
Since the right hand side of (17) does not depend on C it must be the case that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )CUBAUCUAU 5.05.0,5.05.0 +∧+ϕ  is independent of C. Therefore, we can set 
( )CU  to an arbitrary value e.g. ( ) ( )BAUCU ∧−= . This implies that we can write function 
 as a function of only one variable ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUAUBAUAU ∧−=∧ ϕϕ , . 
To summarize, we have shown that if Axioms 1-6 hold then for any lotteries A,B∈ℒ 
such that BA ≠  we can write 
(18) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU
BAUAUBAP ∧−+∧−
∧−= ϕϕ
ϕ, . 
In the proof of Proposition 3 we already established that lottery BA∧  yields 
outcome xi with probability { } { }∑∑∑∑ −=−=== −= 111111 ,max,max ij jij jij jij ji babac , { }ni ,...,1∈ . 
Note that Proposition 1 implies that ( ) 5.0, ≥BAP  if and only if ( ) ( )BUAU ≥ . Equation 
(18) implies that ( ) 5.0, ≥BAP  if and only if ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU ∧−≥∧− ϕϕ . 
Thus, if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BAUBUBAUAU ∧−≥∧−  then ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU ∧−≥∧− ϕϕ  
i.e. function (.) is non-decreasing. Note that ( ) ( )BAUAU ∧≥  for any A,B∈ℒ and hence 
function (.) is on +. Since we initially set ( ) 00 =ϕ  and function (.) is non-decreasing, it 
must be the case that :+→+. Q.E.D. 
